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Overruling McCulloch?
Mark A. Graber
Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the
Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national
bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress. 1
This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster
was a close association of Justice Joseph Story. 2 The justices at
this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial
sentiments on the issues of the day. 3 Even if Webster lacked firsthand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in
a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the
personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig
pessimism. Most Jacksonians vigorously opposed the national
bank on both policy and constitutional grounds.4 The most
vigorous opponents of that institution had been appointed to the
Taney Court. The partisan activities of these justices while on the
bench gave little hope that Taney Court majorities would abandon

Regents Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. Much thanks to David
Schwartz and the Arkansas Law Review for their help and forbearance. Thanks to Mark
Killenbeck for helping me avoid many unforced errors.
1. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE : WEBSTER, CLAY, AND
CALHOUN 306-07 (1987). See CARL BRENT SWISHER, H ISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED S TATES: VOLUME 5, T HE T ANEY PERIOD, 1836-64 at 29 (1974) [hereinafter
TANEY PERIOD] (quoting Leslie Combs to Nicholas Biddle, July 27, 1835) (“Genl J. says
the Bk is unconstitutional. Mr. Van Buren echoes the opinion and old Tecumseh [Richard
Johnson] follows suit. Will the Judges—his officers, dare to decide otherwise by & bye?”).
2. See CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. T ANEY 201-02, 258-59 (Archon Books
1961) (1935) [hereinafter ROGER T ANEY] (noting that Story routinely advised Webster on
the constitutional issues of the day).
3. See id. at 564. The most famous leak of judicial sentiments occurred when Justice
John Catron, with the permission of Chief Justice Taney, Justice Robert Grier and Justice
James Wayne, kept President-elect James Buchanan informed of the judicial deliberations in
the Dred Scott case. See Philip Auchampaugh, James Buchanan, the Court and the Dred
Scott Case, TENN. HIST. MAG., Jan. 1926, at 231-38; TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 61518. Taney may have privately discussed how to resolve Dred Scott with Attorney General
Caleb Cushing. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 500. John McLean may have leaked
information about the judicial deliberations in Dred Scott to his supporters. Id. at 489.
4. See MICHAEL F. HOLT, T HE R ISE AND F ALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG P ARTY:
JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE C IVIL WAR 16 (1999).
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their partisan predilections when deciding a case raising those
constitutional questions that divided their Jacksonian sponsors
from their Whig rivals.
Webster’s prediction that the Supreme Court was primed to
overrule McCulloch v. Maryland 5 on the constitutionality of
federal power to incorporate a national bank was widely shared. 6
Thomas Hart Benton praised President Andrew Jackson for
“prepar[ing] the way for a reversal of that decision.”7 Reverdy
Johnson, a leading Democrat and member of the Supreme Court
bar was “convinced that the Court would declare that it would be
unconstitutional to establish a branch [of the national] bank in a
state that had specifically refused to sanction it.” 8 Representative
Henry Wise noted that Whigs in Congress committed to
rechartering the national bank should consider the composition of
the Supreme Court, and then ask, “if the distinguished gentleman
[Taney], who removed the public deposites [sic] from the Bank
of the United States was not at the head of it, and if a majority of
its members, was not of that school of politicians, who believed a
Bank of the United States to be unconstitutional?”9
This paper explores whether Webster was right to fear a
judicial overruling of McCulloch v. Maryland. The bulk of the
essay discusses the relevant political and constitutional
commitments of the sixteen justices who sat on the Taney Court
from 1837 until 1860. That analysis concludes that the Supreme
Court probably would have overruled McCulloch’s holding that
the federal government was constitutionally authorized to
incorporate a national bank if a proper vehicle for doing so had
come before the court. From 1837 until 1853, the median justice
on the Taney Court had fought with Andrew Jackson in the bank
wars while serving in the executive or legislative branch of the
national government. After 1853, at least seven justices were
committed Jacksonians who were either on record as declaring
the national bank unconstitutional or, where primary sources are
not available, were regarded by their peers as persons with
5. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
6. See Gerard N. Magliocca, “Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional
Law,” 78 NEB. L. REV. 205, 248-50 (1999).
7. 13 CONG. DEB. 387 (1837).
8. NORMAL LOISE PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON
AND JOHN TYLER 70 (1989) (quoting Reverdy Johnson).
9. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1841).
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orthodox Jacksonian positions on the constitutional issues of the
day.
The following pages are concerned with whether in the
proper case the Supreme Court would have overruled McCulloch
by holding that Congress had no power to incorporate a national
bank or no power to adopt other crucial planks of Henry Clay’s
American System. The American System, on which the Whig
party campaigned for most of its history, 10 was a set of proposed
exercises of national power to stimulate commercial
development. Proposals included a national bank, federal internal
improvements, protective tariffs and the distribution of federal
surpluses from the sale of public lands to the states to enable states
to sponsor more local commercial developments. 11 The Supreme
Court in McCulloch ruled that the federal government had power
to incorporate a national bank. 12 Immediately after handing down
the decision, the Justice William Johnson wrote a letter to
President Monroe—claiming to speak for all the justices on the
Supreme Court—saying his brethren believed that the
constitutional justification for federal power to incorporate a
national bank also provided constitutional justification for federal
power to sponsor internal improvements. 13 The analysis below
suggests that the Taney Court would not have been as hospitable
to these exercises of federal power, and that the justices would
not have sustained federal power to incorporate a national bank,
sponsor internal improvements, or adopt related Whig policies.
This paper does not consider whether in overruling
McCulloch’s holding that Congress under Article I could
incorporate a national bank, the Taney Court would also have
overruled McCulloch’s holding that the national government had
implied powers or that states could not interfere in any way with

10.
See
WHIG
P ARTY,
PLATFORM
OF
1852,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/whig-party-platform-1852
[https://perma.cc/92AZ-RY78];
WHIG
P ARTY,
P LATFORM
OF
1844,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/whig-party-platform-1844
[https://perma.cc/F3Y4-6YMJ].
11. See HOLT, supra note 4, at 2.
12. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
13. Whether Johnson was speaking for the entire court is doubtful. See Mark R.
Killenbeck, William Johnson: The Dog That Did Not Bark, 62 VAND. L. REV. 407, 441-42
(2007).
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federal programs.14 David Schwartz’s essay in this symposium
makes a powerful case that Jacksonians in general and the Taney
Court in particular adopted modified understandings of implied
federal powers and reserved state powers that did not require a
head-on assault on the pillars of Marshall Court jurisprudence.
He observes, “Jacksonian legalists had a plan to undermine
McCulloch v. Maryland without overruling it, and thereby
maintain the prestige of a Supreme Court that would take a
notably states’-rights turn.”15 The Taney Court, however, would
not have had to abandon implied powers to overrule McCulloch’s
specific holding. A judicial decision declaring Congress had no
power to incorporate a national bank would more likely assert that
the national government did not have this particular implied
power or that the bank was not sufficiently necessary to the
exercise of the enumerated powers than denounce every sentence
in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion.
The continued survival of McCulloch raises important
questions about the nature of judicial power and constitutional
authority. The simple explanation for the judicial failure to
overrule McCulloch is that no proper vehicle came before the
Court. Jacksonian presidents forestalled litigation by vetoing
efforts to recharter the national bank and vetoing those internal
improvement bills that raised similar questions of federal
constitutional power. A more sophisticated answer is that, in
Jacksonian America, parties rather than courts had the final
authority to determine the official constitutional law of the land.
The Taney Court left McCulloch alone because the national
executive and the national legislature during the thirty years
before the Civil War took responsibility for resolving
constitutional issues concerning the scope of federal power over
national economic life.
The conclusion briefly raises questions about constitutional
pedagogy in times of regime change. The fate of McCulloch
during the three decades after Roger Brooke Taney assumed the
Chief Justiceship illustrates how official constitutional law may
diverge from constitutional politics on the ground. Persons
14. See David S. Schwartz, Defying McCulloch? Jackson’s Bank Veto Reconsidered,
72 ARK. L. REV 129, 158 (2019) (noting that “McCulloch’s doctrine extended beyond the
Bank, to the matter of implied congressional powers in general”).
15. Id. at 163.
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during the 1850s training “practice-ready” constitutional lawyers
to represent clients might have continued teaching McCulloch,
given that decision was never officially overruled. They might
have better prepared students by teaching McCulloch and Taney
Court cases that ignored McCulloch, teaching McCulloch and the
bank veto, or just teaching the various Jacksonian vetoes of
American System measures. Constitutional law professors in our
time of regime change may soon be confronting analogous
pedagogical challenges with analogous alternatives.

I. FEDERAL POWER AND JUDICIAL
RECRUITMENT IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA
Jacksonian Democrats after 1832 were relatively united in
their effort to limit certain powers of the federal government.
Many Jacksonians were nationalists on issues concerning national
expansion and federal assistance during the rendition process for
fugitive slaves, 16 but on matters concerning federal regulation of
the economy, antebellum Democrats almost always advanced
narrower conceptions of federal power than their Whig rivals.
Democratic Party Platforms from 1840 to 1856 contained the
identical declaration that “the federal government is one of
limited powers, derived solely from the Constitution; and the
grants of power made therein, ought to be strictly construed by all
the departments and agents of government; and that it is
inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional
powers.”17 That assertion was immediately followed by nearly
identical provisions declaring unconstitutional a national bank,

16. See Arthur Bestor, State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of
Proslavery Constitutional Doctrine, J. OF THE ILL. S T. HIST. SOC’Y, Summer 1961, at 138140.
17.
DEMOCRATIC
P ARTY,
1856
P LATFORM,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1856-democratic-party-platform
[https://perma.cc/WF62-F7XU];
DEMOCRATIC
P ARTY,
1852
PLATFORM,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1852-democratic-party-platform
[https://perma.cc/4VJN-4B6C];
DEMOCRATIC
P ARTY,
1848
PLATFORM,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1848-democratic-party-platform
[https://perma.cc/NBZ4-Z5XJ];
DEMOCRATIC
P ARTY,
1844
PLATFORM,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1860-democratic-party-platform
[https://perma.cc/22QL-7EFK];
DEMOCRATIC
P ARTY,
1840
PLATFORM,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1840-democratic-party-platform
[https://perma.cc/E23P-3MAR].
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any federally sponsored internal improvements and various
schemes to distribute to the states the proceeds from the sale of
public lands. The protective tariff, while not expressly declared
unconstitutional, was claimed to be inconsistent with “justice and
sound policy.”18 Jacksonians in 1852 and 1856 added a provision
stating, “the democratic party will faithfully abide by and uphold
the principles laid down in the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions
of 1798, and in the report of Mr. Madison to the Virginia
legislature in 1799 . . . .”19
Jacksonian politicians made self-conscious efforts to secure
a federal judiciary committed to this narrow conception of federal
power. Presidents after 1830 carefully scrutinized their judicial
nominees to ensure fidelity to Jacksonian constitutional visions.
In 1834, Jackson informed Martin Van Buren that only jurists
whose “principles on the Constitution are sound, and well fixed”
were considered for Supreme Court appointments. 20 Van Buren
in turn sought to ensure that prospective justices were
“Democrat[s] [who] would stick to the true principles of the
Constitution.”21 Tyler insisted that “no one should be appointed
who was of the school of Story and Kent.” 22 Concerned that
Marshall Court justices were “broadly Federal and latitudinarian
in all their decisions involving questions of Constitutional
power,” Polk “resolved to appoint no man who was not an
original Democrat and strict constitutionalist, and who would be
less likely to relapse into the broad Federal doctrines of Judge
Marshall and Judge Story.” 23
Jacksonians were committed to appointing justices willing
to act on these commitments to limiting powers. They sought
what would later be called “judicial activists” rather than
proponents of judicial restraint. Before joining the bench, Many
18. See sources cited supra note 17.
19. See sources cited supra note 17.
20. Richard P. Longaker, Andrew Jackson and the Judiciary, 71 POL. SCI. Q. 341, 358
n.43 (1956) (quoting Andrew Jackson to Martin Van Buren, October 27, 1834).
21. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 428.
22. 2 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 523 (William W. Story, ed., Books
for Libraries Press: Freeport, NY, 1971) [hereinafter 2 LIFE AND LETTERS]. Millard
Fillmore, by comparison, sought to pack the judiciary with committed Whigs. See ROGER
TANEY, supra note 2, at 445 (quoting Fillmore to Webster, September 10, 1851).
23. JAMES K. POLK, POLK: T HE D IARY OF A PRESIDENT 1845-1849 37 (ed. Allan
Nevins, Longmans, Green and Co.: London, 1929). See CHARLES GROVE SELLERS, JR.,
JAMES K POLK: CONTINENTALIST 1843-46 298 (1966).
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Taney Court justices aggressively championed the judicial power
to declare laws unconstitutional. While on the New Hampshire
bench in the 1810s, Levi Woodbury endorsed both judicial review
and judicial supremacy when declaring a law unconstitutional. 24
James Wayne vigorously opposed a Georgia resolution denying
federal judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional. 25 On the
Tennessee Supreme Court, John Catron agitated for Jacksonian
policies from the bench and revised his own views to bring them
in line with Jackson’s. 26 Barbour when litigating Cohens v.
Virginia insisted that the Supreme Court must protect state
sovereignty by declaring unconstitutional overly broad federal
laws.27 John Bannister Gibson disqualified himself for a
Jacksonian judicial appointment in Eakin v. Raub28 by
questioning the judicial power to declare unconstitutional the act
of a coordinate branch of government. 29
Jacksonian executives sought to ensure reliable justices who
would break what they perceived as a Federalist stranglehold on
the federal judiciary by appointing veterans of the Bank War with
close personal and partisan connections to other influential
Jacksonian leaders to the Supreme Court. Most Jacksonian
judicial nominees first attracted public notice during the political
struggles over the appropriate scope of federal power contested
during the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s.30 Roger Taney, Levi
Woodbury, James Wayne, Philip Pendleton Barbour, John
McKinley, Nathan Clifford, and John Catron played prominent
roles in Jacksonian fights against the national bank and the
American system. Taney and Woodbury were trusted members
24. See Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 201-03, 210 (1818). See also 2 LEVI
WOODBURY, WRITINGS OF LEVI WOODBURY: POLITICAL, JUDICIAL AND LITERARY 333-34,
344 (ed. Charles L. Woodbury, Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1852); William D.
Bader, Henry J. Abraham & James B. Staab, The Jurisprudence of Levi Woodbury, 18 VT.
L. REV. 261, 274-75 (1994).
25. ALEXANDER A. L AWRENCE, JAMES MOORE WAYNE: SOUTHERN UNIONIST 26-27
(1943).
26. See Edmund C. Gass, The Constitutional Opinions of Justice John Catron, 8 E.
TENN. HIST. SOC’Y’S PUBLICATIONS 54, 54-55, 58 (1936).
27. See WILLIAM S. BELKO, P HILIP PENDLETON BARBOUR IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA:
AN OLD REPUBLICAN IN K ING ANDREW’S COURT 79-82 (2016).
28. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-45 (Pa. 1825).
29. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A H ISTORY OF U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 78 (5th ed. 2008).
30. For the precise details of each justice’s political activities before joining the bench,
see infra Part II.
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of Jackson’s cabinet (McLean was appointed to the federal bench
in part because on patronage matters he was not a trusted member
of Jackson’s cabinet31). Clifford was the attorney general under
Polk. Daniel turned down offers to join both Van Buren’s and
Polk’s cabinets, though he remained “one of [Van Buren’s] most
effective advisors.”32 Barbour was almost the Jacksonian
nominee for vice president in 1832.33 Woodbury, Wayne,
Barbour, McKinley and Clifford were Jacksonian leaders in
Congress. Nelson was a Jacksonian candidate for the Senate in
New York. Baldwin, Taney, Catron, McKinley, and Daniel
played major roles organizing Jacksonian forces in Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Tennessee, Alabama and Virginia respectively. 34
Supreme Court justices on the Taney Court did not abandon
partisan activities once on the bench.
Catron remained
particularly active in political affairs. He helped manage James
K. Polk’s successful presidential campaign in 1844 and served as
a trusted political advisor to Jackson, Polk and James Buchanan. 35
Taney corresponded regularly with Jacksonian presidents on the
issues of the day and helped formulate Martin Van Buren’s

31. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 78; Swisher, ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 13233.
32. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 84-85; ROGER T ANEY, supra note 2, at 245.
33. BELKO, supra note 27, at 169-74; ROGER T ANEY, supra note 2, at 433.
34. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 79 (noting “Baldwin had been instrumental in
bringing Pennsylvania into the Jacksonian fold in the election of 1828”); Id. at 80 (noting
Taney “served as chairman of the Jackson Central Committee of Maryland in 1828”); Id. at
83 (crediting Catron for having “created a favorable public climate on behalf of Jacksonian
policies” in Tennessee); Id. at 84 (“McKinley had been one of Van Buren’s key managers
during the presidential campaign of 1836 and was personally responsible for capturing
Alabama’s electoral votes”); Id. (Daniel “had worked hard for Jackson in the abortive
campaign of 1824 and in the ensuing campaigns as well”).
35. Letter from John Catron to James Polk (Aug. 27, 1839), in 5 CORRESPONDENCE
OF JAMES K. POLK, 1839-1841, 211 (Wayne Cutler ed., Vand. Univ. Press 1989); Letter
from William Allen to James Polk (Oct. 20, 1839) in 5 CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES K.
POLK, 1839-1841, 266 (Wayne Cutler ed., Vand. Univ. Press 1989); Letter from John Catron
to James Polk (Nov. 19, 1839) in 5 CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES K. POLK, 1839-1841, 302
(Wayne Cutler ed., Vand. Univ. Press 1989). See also CHARLES GRIER SELLERS, JR., JAMES
K. POLK: JACKSONIAN 1795-1843 322, 350-51, 384, 400, 454-55 (1957); SELLERS,
CONTINENTALIST, supra note 23, at 5, 19-20; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 438; Gass,
supra note 26, at 54-55, 58, 71. Catron may have written the portion of President Buchanan’s
inaugural address that urged citizens to adhere to whatever ruling the Supreme Court made
on the constitutional status of slavery in the territories. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 617,
621.
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financial policies.36 Taney did not hide his partisan sentiments
when congratulating Polk on the Tennessee Jacksonian leader’s
election as president. The Chief Justice wrote,
I feel so truly rejoiced at your election as President of
the U. States, that I must indulge myself in the pleasure
of offering you my cordial congratulations. We have
passed through no contest for the Presidency more
important than the one just over; nor have I seen any
one before in which so many dangerous influences were
combined together as were united in support of Mr.
Clay. Your triumphant success gives me increased
confidence in the intelligence firmness & virtue of the
American people; and in the safety and stability of the
principles upon which our institutions are founded. 37
Daniel continued to advise Democratic leaders and
conservative Virginia politicians. He publicly supported Martin
Van Buren’s presidential efforts in 1844.38 Taney, Grier and
Clifford regularly informed Buchanan, his subordinates or
political allies that the Supreme Court fully supported crucial
administration policies. 39
Grier vigorously supported the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, publicly attacking opponents of that
measure.40 Story drafted Whig campaign documents and
legislative proposals, including the prototype for the Fugitive

36. ROGER T ANEY, supra note 2, at 339-42, 344-45. Taney served as Attorney
General form almost a year after the Senate confirmed his nomination as Chief Justice.
During this time, he advised Jackson on constitutional issues and helped write the president’s
farewell address. Id. at 326-27.
37. Letter from Roger B. Taney to James Polk in 9 CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES K.
POLK, SEPTEMBER – DECEMBER 1844, 338 (Wayne Cutler ed., Univ. of Tenn. Press 1993).
See SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY, supra note 3, at 435-36, 457-58, 554. Taney may have
privately discussed the proper ruling in Dred Scott with Attorney General Caleb Cushing.
Taney may have also privately discussed the proper ruling in Dred Scott with Attorney
General Caleb Cushing. See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 620.
38. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 434-45; JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL
DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V. DANIEL, 1784-1860 142 (1964). See also ROGER
TANEY, supra note 2 at 437-38 (discussing Daniel to Van Buren, November 19, 1844);
TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 400.
39. See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 645 (quoting Taney to Franklin Pierce, August
29, 1857); Id. at 732-33 (quoting Robert Grier to J.S. Black, September 15, 1859 and Nathan
Clifford to James Buchanan, July 19, 1859).
40. See ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 482. Grier publicly sided with Attorney
General Jeremiah Black in his debate with Stephen Douglas over the proper interpretation of
Dred Scott. Id.
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Slave Act of 1850. 41 McLean used his judicial post as a
springboard for his incessant campaigns for the presidency. 42
Samuel Nelson and John Campbell were seriously considered for
the Democratic Party’s 1860 presidential nomination.43
Woodbury probably would have been the Democratic Party
nominee in 1852 had he not suddenly died. 44 The Jay Court may
have sworn off issuing official advisory opinions, 45 but that
precedent did not inhibit Story, Daniel and Baldwin from
responding to a Senate request to analyze a federal bankruptcy
law46 or Story from submitting to the full court his proposals for
expanding federal admiralty jurisdiction. 47
The Jacksonian tendency to prefer seasoned political
veterans for judicial vacancies provided the same benefit to
Jacksonians and contemporary scholars: known opinions on the
constitutional questions of the day. Jacksonian Presidents could
and contemporary scholars can learn what Jacksonian justices
thought about the constitutional issues of the day by looking at
their congressional speeches, writings when in the cabinet,
partisan activities before joining the bench and partisan activities
after their Supreme Court appointments. Jacksonian executives
had the paper trail necessary to have a high degree of confidence
that their judicial nominees were committed to Jacksonian
understandings of national power and the judicial function.
Contemporary scholars who read the primary and secondary
sources can access judicial values directly when they construct
various models of judicial decision making rather than use
judicial votes to establish the judicial values that explain those
41. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME
THE O LD REPUBLIC 376-77 (1985).

COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH S TORY: S TATESMAN OF

42. For McLean’s presidential ambitions, see Paul Brickner, Reassessing LongAccepted Truths About Justice John McLean: His Secret of Success, 38 OHIO N. UNIV. L.
REV. 193, 202-04 (2011); Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and
Supreme Court Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519, 520, 525-33 (2009).
43. Ronald Sklut, John Archibald Campbell: A Study in Divided Loyalties, 20 ALA.
LAW. 233, 244 (1959).
44. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 526. For Woodbury’s decade-long quest to
become president, see Bader, Abraham, & Staab, supra note 24, at 265-66.
45. Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington in 6 THE
DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S TATES , 1789-1800, 755
(Maeva Marcus ed., Colum. Univ. Press 1998).
46. Taney, Thompson and McLean refrained. See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at
432.
47. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 432.
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votes or, almost as bad, use newspaper predictions of judicial
votes to establish judicial values. 48A judge, who when in
Congress repeatedly declared that Congress had no power to
incorporate a national bank, and when on the bench frequently
engaged in political maneuvers to advance Jacksonian causes,
was a judge a Jacksonian president could trust to vote the party
line when there was a party line and a judge a twenty-first century
law professor could predict in an appropriate case would reject
McCulloch’s holding that Congress had power to incorporate a
national bank.

II. THE JUDGES
Sixteen justices sat on the Supreme Court from 1837 until
1860.49 Twelve were appointed by Jacksonian Democrats,
although Henry Baldwin and John McLean were appointed by
Andrew Jackson before sharp partisan divisions over national
power began structuring constitutional politics. Two, Joseph
Story and Smith Thomson, were appointed by National
Republicans, most of whom by 1815 had come to accept the
constitutionality of the national bank. Samuel Nelson was
appointed by a nominal Whig, John Tyler, whose opinions on
national power were those of an orthodox Jacksonian.50
Benjamin Curtis was appointed by Millard Fillmore, an orthodox
Whig.
The available sources are more helpful for identifying some
judicial attitudes and some justices’ attitudes on the political
merits and constitutional status of American system proposals
than others. For some justices, most notably Story and Roger
Brooke Taney, the substantial primary and secondary sources
provide insight into almost all details of their professional and
private lives. For other justices, Peter Daniel and Curtis being

48. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 (1989).
49. For the conventional history of appointments to the Taney Court, see ABRAHAM,
supra note 29, at 77-93.
50. Frank Otto Gatell, Samuel Nelson, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: T HEIR L IVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, 817, 819-22 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L Israel eds. 1969).
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good examples, 51 the primary and secondary sources are more
than sufficient to assess their attitudes on the political and
constitutional merits of various American System proposals. For
yet other justices, John Catron and John Archibald Campbell
being good examples,52 the primary and secondary sources, while
providing much information, either do not address particular
issues or are ambiguous. In the case of Robert Grier and Samuel
Nelson, for whom few primary and secondary sources exist, little
more than partisanship can be determined with any confidence.
Several rough categories of justices emerge when the
justices on the Taney Court are rank ordered from the most
opposed to American System proposals to the most supportive of
such measures. Five justices—Daniel, Barbour, Woodbury,
Clifford, and Taney—repeatedly condemned American system
proposals on political and constitutional grounds. Two other
justices, Catron and Wayne, repeatedly condemned American
system proposals, condemned some on constitutional grounds,
participated actively in the fight against the national bank, allied
with politicians who declared the bank unconstitutional, but never
made an absolutely clear declaration that the Constitution forbade
Congress from incorporating a national bank, at least in easily
accessible primary sources. McKinley and Campbell throughout
most of their careers belonged to the first or second category of
justices, but occasionally appeared open to some American
system proposals. Robert Grier and Samuel Nelson were
orthodox Jacksonians who left no paper trail adequate to
determine their specific views on the national bank or related
proposals. Smith Thompson left a meager paper trail, but one
more suggestive of a Whig orientation toward the constitutional
questions of the 1830s. Baldwin, McLean, Curtis and Story were
orthodox Whigs.
The rank ordering below is more impressionistic than
scientific. The brief discussions use no rigid formula for
determining the strength and scope of political and constitutional
objections to American System proposals. Justices who declared
the bank unconstitutional rank as more opposed than justices who
51. See infra notes 58-61, 152-60. The other examples are Philip Barbour, Levi
Woodbury, Nathan Clifford and John McLean. See also infra notes 62-81, 161-68.
52. See infra notes 87-91, 125-34. The other examples are James Wayne, John
McKinley, Smith Thompson and Henry Baldwin. See also infra notes 92-124, 140-51.
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merely condemned the bank in powerful terms, even though no
good reason exists for thinking that, say, Wayne was less opposed
to the bank than Taney on either political or constitutional
grounds. The rank ordering of justices in the same category is for
all practical purposes random. Whether Grier or Nelson was the
more orthodox Jacksonian is impossible to determine, as is
determining whether Daniel or Barbour was the stricter
constructionist.
The following rank ordering of justices by how narrowly
they interpreted the constitutional powers of the national
government is also unscientific because attitudes are determined
by off the bench behavior. The discussion of Levi Woodbury
concludes he was opposed to the American System because
Woodbury gave numerous speeches that condemned American
system proposals, he consistently voted against American System
proposals in Congress, he helped draft Jackson’s bank veto
message, he was a leading candidate for the Democratic
presidential nomination in 1852, his contemporaries regarded
Woodbury as a militant opponent of the American system and
Woodbury’s biographers after extensively researching the
primary documents concluded that Woodbury was an orthodox
Jacksonian.53 The more scientific approach in orthodox political
science determines judicial attitudes by judicial votes or
newspaper articles predicting judicial votes.54 Jeffery Segal and
Harold Spaeth scientifically conclude that Levi Woodbury was
“staunchly Hamiltonian” because Woodbury frequently voted
against state power in contract clause cases. 55 The value of the
unscientific approach taken in this paper is for readers to
determine.
Peter Daniel. Justice Peter Daniel was probably the most
militant Jacksonian on the Taney Court. Daniel, “a major
Jackson-Van Buren lieutenant in Virginia” before joining the
federal bench, 56 opposed virtually every proposal in the
53. Bader, Abraham, & Staab, supra note 24, at 281.
54. See Segal & Cover, supra note 48, at 559; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE S UPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, 320-21 (2002).
55. HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, THE S UPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 82 (1993). For Woodbury’s tendency to reject Jacksonian orthodoxy
on contract clause cases, see Planter’s Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. 301 (1848); Bader, Abraham
& Staab, supra note 24, at 289-305.
56. FRANK, supra note 38, at 77.
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American system and did so on constitutional grounds. With
reference to an unknown political actor, Daniel in 1840 declared,
“[h]e has professed a belief in the constitutionality of a national
bank, and that is an objection which with me would overrule any
and every recommendation which could be urged for him or for
any other person.”57 Daniel in 1843 informed Martin Van Buren
that “[s]ince a protective tariff necessarily aided selective
industries, it was a discrimination and hence unconstitutional.” 58
When President Polk vetoed on constitutional grounds an internal
improvements bill, he received a congratulatory note from Daniel,
urging him to stand firm against any future congressional
legislation of that ilk. 59
Philip Pendleton Barbour. Justice Barbour was as militant
an opponent of federal power as Justice Daniel. The essay on
Barbour in the Biographical Encyclopedia of Supreme Court
Justices describes him as being “as representative a Virginia strict
constructionist as can be found.” 60 Barbour’s recent biographer
details “his constant and determined struggle to stem the tide of
Clay’s so-called American System—a protective tariff, federally
sponsored internal improvements, and a national bank.”61 When
in Congress from 1814 to 1824 and again from 1827 to 1830,
Barbour consistently opposed legislation broadly interpreting
national power.62 He fought “a relentless war . . . against the
tariff and internal improvements” during his first stint in Congress
and, on his return to the national legislature, “fired the first salvo
of Jackson’s forthcoming war against the Bank of the United
States.”63 Barbour on the floor of Congress repeatedly declared
57. FRANK, supra note 38, at 111, 113 (quoting Peter Daniel to William Brent,
February 29, 1840). TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 67; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at
428-29.
58. FRANK, supra note 38, at 164-65 (quoting Peter Daniel to Martin Van Buren, July
6, 1843).
59. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 400 (quoting Peter Daniel to James Polk, August
5, 1846). See FRANK, supra note 38, at 315 n.3; id. at 213 (“Daniel’s detestation of internal
improvements financed by the Federal government was as great as his hatred of banks, and
he could as easily claim that they were unconstitutional”).
60. FRANK OTTO GATELL, Philip Pendleton Barbour, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED S TATES S UPREME COURT 1789-1969: T HEIR L IVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, 717
(Leon Friedman & Fred L Israel eds. 1969).
61. BELKO, supra note 27, at 3.
62. DANIEL FELLER, THE P UBLIC L ANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS 50 (1984); TANEY
PERIOD, supra note 1, at 56.
63. BELKO, supra note 27, at 3.
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internal improvements, protective tariffs, national bankruptcy
laws and the national bank unconstitutional. 64 When challenging
these proposals, he championed an interpretation of national
power even narrower than what Jackson outlined in his veto
messages. Barbour insisted that “the framers of the Constitution
meant to guard as carefully against the latitudinous construction
which might be given to indefinite powers” and maintained that
all federal measures had to have an “immediate, direct, and
appropriate relation to the granted power.”65 When defending
Jackson’s veto of the Maysville road bill, Barbour asserted that
his only quarrel with administration policy was Jackson’s claim
that the federal government could constitutionally build some
roads.66 “We were not authorized to construct either post roads
or military roads, or dig canals,” he at another time declared,
“either by any power expressly granted or properly to be
inferred.”67 Barbour frequently challenged the Marshallian
pretensions of such cases as McCulloch. He informed fellow
representations that the Marshall Court had “enlarged the sphere
of its action . . . to an indefinite extent beyond what was in the
contemplation of those who formed it.” 68
Levi Woodbury. Levi Woodbury was the leading New
England opponent of the American System and the interpretation
of federal powers that justified constitutional power to
incorporate a national bank. His biographer describes Woodbury
64. See 4 REG. DEB. 1644-645 (1828); 41 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1679, 1918-19
(1823); 38 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1060-62 (1821); 35 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess.
1221, 2054-56 (1819); 30 ANNALS OF CONG., 2nd Sess. 893-99 (1816). For Barbour’s
political and constitutional opposition to federally sponsored internal improvements, see 6
REG. DEB. 1143-44, 646-54 (1830); 5 REG. DEB. 251-54 (1829); 4 REG. D EB. 1513 (1827);
41 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1005-13 (1823); 31 ANNALS OF CONG., 2nd Sess. 1159-64
(1817); 30 ANNALS OF CONG., 2nd Sess. 893-98 (1816); BELKO, supra note 27, at 59-63,
113, 132, 167-68. For Barbour’s political and constitutional opposition to federal bankruptcy
laws, see 38 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1060-72 (1821); 35 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess.
2054-55 (1819). For Barbour’s political and constitutional opposition to the incorporation
of the national bank, see BELKO, supra note 27, at 135-38. See also GATELL, Phillip
Pendleton Barbour, supra note 60, at 719, 724-25; P.P. Cynn, Philip P. Barbour, THE JOHN
P. BRANCH H ISTORICAL P APERS OF R ANDOLPH-MACON COLLEGE, 67,70, 72, 75
(Richmond, E. Waddey Co. 1913); ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 172 (noting that in
Congress, Barbour “initiated one of the early skirmishes” in the Bank War).
65. 31 ANNALS OF CONG., 2nd Sess. 627, 1156 (1817) (“natural, direct, and obvious
relation”). See BELKO, supra note 27, at 73-74.
66. 6 REG. DEB. 1143-44 (1830).
67. 31 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1152 (1817).
68. 4 REG. DEB. 1645 (1827); see BELKO, supra note 27, at 84.
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as “a strict constructionist of the Constitution” who “deplored”
McCulloch v. Maryland.69 Woodbury was a prominent
Jacksonian leader in the House of Representatives and then in the
Senate, where he repeatedly condemned both the national bank
and internal improvements on constitutional grounds.70 “[A]
national banking corporation,” he declared, “is at all times, and in
all forms, unconstitutional.” 71 Another speech in Congress
asserted, “the State Rights man or Democrat of 1798, who can
swallow this new fiscal Bank as constitutional, could swallow
both Jonah and the whale as easy as the whale did Jonah alone.” 72
Woodbury when in Jackson’s cabinet supported the presidential
decision to veto the bill rechartering the national bank and helped
write the veto message declaring that institution
unconstitutional.73
Nathan Clifford. Nathan Clifford was a younger associate
and near political clone of Woodbury, who Clifford regarded as
one of “the great men of our country.” 74 Both Woodbury and
Clifford were New England Jacksonians who had extensive
political careers before joining the bench and were committed
throughout their political life to limiting national power. 75
Clifford first came to national attention as the author of a state
resolution against reincorporating the national bank. 76 His
speeches in Congress repeated that position. He was “opposed to
a National Bank,” Clifford declared in one congressional speech,

69. Philip D. Wheaton, Levi Woodbury: Jacksonian Financier (1955) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Maryland). See Bader, Abraham & Staab, supra note 24, at 261,
261 (“Woodbury’s raison d’etre on the Court was states’ rights, as protected by a strict
construction of constitutional powers”).
70. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, 23, 192, 260, 380 (1841); 6 REG.
DEB. 179-83 (1830). For a brief summary of Woodbury’s political career, see Bader,
Abraham & Staab, supra note 24, at 265-66.
71. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1841).
72. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 41 (1841).
73. For Woodbury’s role in the bank veto, see Wheaton, supra note 69, at 42-45;
ROGER T ANEY, supra note 2, at 194; T ANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 101. For Woodbury’s
opposition to the national bank while in Jackson’s cabinet, see Bader, Abraham & Staab,
supra note 24, at 283-84.
74. PHILIP GREELY C LIFFORD, NATHAN CLIFFORD, DEMOCRAT 49-50 (G.P. Putnam’s
Sons: New York 1922).
75. Id. at 13 (“ardent Jackson supporter”); Walter Chandler, Nathan Clifford: A
Triumph of Untiring Effort, 11 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 57, 57 (1925).
76. CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1833).
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“believing it to be both unconstitutional and inexpedient.” 77
Clifford in other legislative speeches asserted that internal
improvements, protective tariffs and efforts to give the states the
proceeds from the sale of public lands were unconstitutional. 78
While a member of Polk’s cabinet, he helped write presidential
veto messages declaring unconstitutional internal improvements
bills.79
Roger Brooke Taney. Roger Brooke Taney may have been
the most orthodox of the Jacksonians on the Taney Court. Daniel
Feller notes that Taney “stood closer to the ideological heart of
Jacksonianism than anyone save Jackson himself.”80 Taney
helped led the fight against the national bank in Jackson’s cabinet.
Taney was the first member of the cabinet to claim the bank was
unconstitutional, he wrote a memo to Jackson urging him to veto
on numerous constitutional grounds the bill rechartering the bank,
he helped draft the passages in Jackson’s veto message that
declared the bank neither constitutionally necessary nor
constitutionally proper and he was the only member of Jackson’s
cabinet who consistently supported Jackson’s effort to remove
federal deposits from the national bank. 81 “The overthrow of The
Monster,” Taney later wrote, “was the greatest of all the great
public services of Genl. Jackson.” 82 Taney opposed on
constitutional grounds other proposed Whig exercises of national
power, most notably bills distributing surplus federal revenue to
the states. He informed President Jackson, “the revenue which
this government is authorized to raise was intended to be used for
national purposes only, and whenever it shall exceed what may
77. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 475 (1840).
78. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 92, 96, 127-30 (1841); CONG. GLOBE,
26th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 475 (1840). See also CLIFFORD, supra note 74, at 109, 115-17,
126-128.
79. PAUL H. BERGERON, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES K. POLK 197 (University Press
of Kansas 1987).
80. DANIEL FELLER, T HE JACKSONIAN PROMISE, AMERICA, 1815-1840 176 (The John
Hopkins University Press 1995).
81. For Taney’s participation in the Bank Wars, see ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at
176-77, 180-81, 189-95, 218-19, 228, 230-32, 258, 333-334. See also CHARLES WARREN,
THE S UPREME COURT IN T HE UNITED S TATES HISTORY 100-05 (Little, Brown, and
Company 1918); T ANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 20.
82. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 2, at 127 (quoting Taney to Ellis Lewis, October 25,
1845). Taney let Jackson know that he approved when President John Tyler vetoed a
national bank bill. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 345 (quoting Taney to Jackson,
September 30, 1841).
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be usefully and constitutionally employed in the exercise of its
legitimate duties it is bound to reduce it.” 83 Taney broke from
more southern justices, Daniel and Barbour in particular, only in
his support for protective tariffs. 84
John Catron. John Catron was a prominent political leader
who did not cease his Jacksonian political maneuvers when on the
bench. He was a “longtime personal and political friend” of
Andrew Jackson and a self-described “enem[y] of the U.S.
Bank.”85 During the bank wars, Catron organized support for
Jackson administration policy and wrote several articles for the
Knoxville Examiner condemning that institution. 86 Immediately
before being appointed to the Supreme Court, Catron urged
Jackson not to be distracted from the “battle against thirty-five
millions of money [the Bank of the United States], against
uncompromising nullification, against a scheme of protection,
and of its correlative, waste by internal improvements.”87 Catron
retained his Jacksonian connections while on the federal bench.
He corresponded regularly with Presidents Jackson, Polk and
Buchanan. He managed Martin Van Buren’s presidential
campaign in Tennessee and was one of Polk’s main campaign
advisors.88 Austin Allen, the author of a rare analysis of Catron’s
83. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 329-331. Taney endorsed Jackson’s decision to
sign a distribution bill that merely deposited federal surpluses with state governments. He
made clear, however, that the federal government could not give such moneys to the states.
He told Jackson that if Jacksonians in the federal government did “not bring [the deposited
funds] back from the states, they will be compelled to sanction a principle, which is directly
at war with that construction of the federal Constitution for which they have been so long
contending.” Id. at 329-331.
84. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 155.
85. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 84; Walter Chandler, The Centenary of Associate
Justice John Catron of the United States Supreme Court (June 11, 1937) (quoting John Catron
to Andrew Jackson, February 5, 1838). See JOSHUA W. C ALDWELL, S KETCHES OF THE
BENCH AND BAR OF TENNESSEE 87 (1898). (“[f]or many years [Catron] had been one of
Jackson’s most ardent admirers and most efficient supporters”); GATELL, Phillip Pendleton
Barbour, supra note 60, at 738, 748-49 (describing Catron as “one of the leading Jackson
men”).
86. TIMOTHY S. H UEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION S TATES JUDGES
AND SECTIONAL D ISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890 51-52 (1999); GATELL, Phillip Pendleton
Barbour, supra note 60, at 739-40; Chandler, supra note 85, at 15; see DONALD MALCOM
ROPER, MR. JUSTICE T HOMPSON AND THE CONSTITUTION 108 (1987); SELLERS,
JACKSONIAN, supra note 35, at 174-75; Gass, supra note 26, at 54-55; TANEY PERIOD, supra
note 1, at 60, 113.
87. GATELL, Phillip Pendleton Barbour, supra note 60, at 743, 745.
88. GATELL, Phillip Pendleton Barbour, supra note 60, at 743, 745; ROPER, supra
note 86, at 108.
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judicial opinions concludes that the Tennessee jurist was devoted
to “Jacksonian jurisprudence” and “articulat[ed] a set of
jurisprudential assumptions quite similar to Taney’s . . . .”89
Catron is ranked below Taney only because, although he devoted
his political life to orthodox Jacksonian causes and condemned
American system proposals in strong terms, no easily accessible
surviving records exists of Catron declaring specifically that
Congress had no constitutional power to incorporate a national
bank or finance internal improvements in the states.
James Wayne. Justice Wayne’s political opinions are easy
to discern though they were less often expressed in constitutional
terms than were those articulated by Barbour, Daniel and
Woodbury.
While a Jacksonian member of Congress
representing Georgia during the 1820s, Wayne led the fight
against Whig efforts to recharter the national bank. Thomas Hart
Benton, the Jacksonian leader of the Missouri delegation,
regarded Wayne as “among the ten zealous, able, determined”
members of the House who support Jackson administration
banking policies.90 Wayne praised Jackson’s veto of the
Maysville Road Bill and declared that Congress had no
constitutional power to pass protective tariffs. 91 Wayne’s
biographer, Alexander Lawrence, concludes that “Wayne had no
trouble in subscribing to his party’s platform, which was
distinctly Jacksonian in tone. It opposed the Bank of the United
States, the principle of the protective tariff, and Internal
Improvements by the general government.” 92 Lawrence is
confident that Wayne would have declared internal improvements
unconstitutional had a proper case come before the court. 93
Although Wayne explicitly declared unconstitutional protective
tariffs and federally sponsored internal improvements, his
89. Austin Allen, Jacksonian Jurisprudence and the Obscurity of Justice John Catron,
62 VAND. L. REV. 491, 493, 517 (2009). See HUEBNER, supra note 86, at 41 (“thorough[ly]
[devoted] to Jacksonian principles”).
90. ALEXANDER A. L AWRENCE, JAMES MOORE WAYNE: SOUTHERN UNIONIST 71-74
(1943) (quoting Benton). See 10 REG. DEB. 350 (1834); 9 REG. DEB. 2132 (1832); 8 REG.
DEB. 351-353 (1831); GATELL, Phillip Pendleton Barbour, supra note 60, at 604; TANEY
PERIOD, supra note 1, at 25-26, 54.
91. 8 REG. DEB. 390 (1831); 6 REG. DEB. 1147-48 (1830); see also LAWRENCE, supra
note 90, at 40, 101-02; 10 REG. DEB. 461 (1834).
92. LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 75; GATELL, Phillip Pendleton Barbour, supra note
60, at 604.
93. LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 102.
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congressional speeches condemning the Bank of the United States
did not as explicitly address constitutional issues. Still, Wayne
interpreted federal powers quite narrowly. His speeches called
for “a limitation of the action of the Government to the text of the
constitution” and rejected “the employment of all means, which
are not essential to the execution of a substantively granted
power.”94 These statements are inconsistent with central planks
of McCulloch and Marshallian jurisprudence. Wayne in 1854
claimed he gave national powers “a rational and limited
interpretation” as opposed to those “whose tendency has been to
give [the national government] legislative ability in cases where
the power has not been delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, or when powers have been asserted by the
Legislation of this United States, which were reserved to the
States respectively or the people.” 95
Wayne exhibited stronger nationalist strains when on the
bench than such stalwart state rights activists as Daniel, Barbour
and Taney. He was more inclined to expand federal jurisdiction
and insist on the exclusivity of the federal commerce power than
some Jacksonian judicial appointees on the Taney Court. 96 Curtis
on the basis of these votes declared that Wayne and McLean were
the “most high-toned Federalists on the bench.” 97 Wayne
exhibited similar nationalist strains in Congress. He supported all
military appropriations, opposed nullification and was the only
member of the Georgia congressional delegation who vote for
Jackson’s Force Bill, a measure that substantially increased the
scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. 98

94. 6 REG. DEB. 701 (1830); James M. Wayne, Address, Thirty-Seventh Annual
Report of the American Colonization Society 40 (C. Alexander, Printer: Washington, DC,
1854); see LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 40, 111.
95. Wayne, supra note 94, at 41.
96. See LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at viii (describing Wayne as “a Georgian who
made love of the Federal Union the governing principle of his political and judicial career”).
97. GEORGE T ICKNOR C URTIS, 1 MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, L.L.D. 168
(Benjamin R. Curtis ed., Little, Brown, and Company 1879) (quoting Benjamin Robbins
Curtis to Mr. Ticknor, February 29, 1852). See Lawrence, supra note 90, at 93-94; SPAETH
& SEGAL, supra note 55, at 82 (describing Wayne as “staunchly Hamiltonian”).
98. LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 55, 63-65; see FRANK OTTO GATELL, James M.
Wayne, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED S TATES S UPREME COURT 1789-1969: T HEIR
LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, 603-04 (Leon Friedman & Fred L Israel eds. 1969). Wayne
also strongly supported Jacksonian efforts to remove the Cherokees from Georgia. See
LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 62.
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These nationalistic sentiments are consistent with important
strains of Jacksonian Democracy.
Jacksonians supported
expanding the federal court system once the federal courts were
staffed with Jacksonians likely to be more pro-slavery than state
court justices in free jurisdictions. 99 Jackson vehemently opposed
nullification and appointed to the Supreme Court only politicians
who supported his position in the Nullification Crisis. 100
Jacksonians as a whole had no consensual understanding of
whether federal commerce power was exclusive. They were
united on a narrow interpretation of federal power, but not on
whether states had concurrent power on those matters on which
the Constitution authorized federal regulation. 101
Wayne
articulated the more nationalistic strand of Jacksonianism that
combined strict construction of national power with sharp limits
on state power to regulate the limited subjects constitutionally
entrusted to the federal government. Wayne’s opinions in slavery
cases illustrate this understanding of national power and
federalism. He agreed with Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that
federal power over the rendition process was exclusive. 102 He
agreed with Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford that Congress had
no power to ban slavery in American territories. 103 Curtis may
have initially associated Wayne with McLean’s Whiggish
nationalism but McLean who was more familiar with Wayne
knew otherwise. During the early 1840s, McLean complained
that Wayne, Catron, Daniel and Thompson had formed a judicial
alliance against the proto-Whig nationalists on the Court. 104
John McKinley. Justice John McKinley was another of the
many Jacksonian judicial appointees who had previously
distinguished themselves in congressional fights against the
national bank. McKinley began his career as a Federalist and
99. See Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political
Fragmentation, and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 126-32 (2009).
100. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 80, 83-84.
101. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
102. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 636 (1842) (Wayne, J., concurring).
103. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 454 (1856) (Wayne, J., concurring). Wayne
was the moving force behind the judicial decision to declare that Congress could not ban
slavery in the territories rather than, as the Taney Court had originally decided, to resolve
Dred Scott strictly on conflict of laws principles. See LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 147-49;
CURTIS, 1 CURTIS, supra note 97, at 206-07, 234-36; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 48798.
104. See FRANK, supra note 38, at 171-72.
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National Republican, 105 but joined the Jacksonian forces by
1826.106 “Once he converted to Jacksonianism,” his biographer
declares, McKinley “remained true to its basic tenets, both on and
off the bench, until his death.” 107 Some contemporaries
questioned whether his initial conversion was sincere, 108 but by
the time Jackson assumed the presidency McKinley had
established his strict constructionist bona fides. McKinley was
the acknowledged leader of Jacksonian forces in Alabama and a
close associate of James K. Polk, then the Jacksonian speaker of
the House.109 He actively participated in the fight against the
national bank in the Alabama legislature, where he wrote a
petition declaring the bank “inconsistent with our free
institutions,” and “dangerous to the peace and safety of the
union.” McKinley in Congress strongly supported Jackson’s
effort to remove government deposits from Biddle’s
institution.110 McKinley was one of five representatives selected
when Jacksonians in the House of Representatives sought to pack
the Ways and Means committee with opponents of the national
bank.111 Without mentioning McCulloch by name, McKinley
condemned Marshall Court decisions by which “the powers of the
Federal Government are, by mere construction, made to
overshadow State powers, and render them almost
contemptible.”112 He insisted that the national government
exercise only those powers “expressly granted by the
Constitution.”113
105. See STEVEN P. BROWN, JOHN MCKINLEY AND THE ANTEBELLUM S UPREME
COURT: C IRCUIT R IDING IN THE O LD SOUTHWEST 20, 27 (2012).
106. Id. at 44, 79; FRANK O TTO GATELL, John McKinley, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, 769-71
(Leon Friedman & Fred L Israel eds. 1969); Jimmie Hicks, Associate Justice John McKinley,
A Sketch, 18 ALA. REV. 227, 238-31 (1965).
107. BROWN, supra note 105, at 6.
108. See John M. Martin, John McKinley: Jacksonian Phase, 28 ALA. H IST. Q. 7, 7
(1966).
109. BROWN, supra note 105, at 103; SELLERS, JACKSONIAN, supra note 35, at 213.
110. Martin, supra note 108, at 27; GATELL, John McKinley, supra note 106, at 77273.
111. BROWN, supra note 105, at 97.
112. Martin, supra note 108, at 9.
113. Martin, supra note 108, at 21 (quoting McKinley); GATELL, John McKinley,
supra note 106, at 770. George Whatley claims that McKinley endorsed “[t]he compact
theory of government” as was “a true disciple of Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Kentucky
Resolution, and of the basic political philosophies of John C. Calhoun.” George C. Whatley,
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McKinley’s record on internal improvements and other
exercises of federal power is less clear than his vigorous
opposition to the national bank. McKinley occasionally spoke
out against federal internal improvements programs, once
describing the system as “unjust and partial.” 114 Throughout his
career, McKinley insisted that the federal government turn over
control of public lands not being used for forts upon statehood.
He maintained, “the United States cannot hold land in any State
of the Union, except for the purposes enumerated in the
Constitution.”115 McKinley at other times supported American
system proposals. McKinley voted for the Maysville Road Bill,
which ran through his home town. 116 He vigorously urged the
federal government to give the proceeds of the sale of public lands
to the states.117
These apparent heresies justify ranking McKinley slightly
below Catron and Wayne, but they are not suggestive of
substantial deviation from Jacksonian constitutional principles.
Many Jacksonians during the early 1830s approved some internal
improvement projects. Such stalwart Jacksonians as Thomas Hart
Benton voted with McKinley for the Maysville Road Bill. 118
Jackson approved several internal improvements projects. 119
Jacksonians united against almost all internal improvements
projects only over time. McKinley was a faithful Jacksonian
during the 1830s because he rejected national power on all
matters that the Jacksonian catechism at that particular time
mandated rejecting national power. Contemporaries regarded
him as an “orthodox, administration Democrat.” 120 Neither
Jackson nor Polk doubted McKinley’s credentials as a strict
constructionist.121
In 1836, the year before his judicial
Justice John McKinley, 4 BULLETIN OF THE NORTH ALABAMA H ISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
15, 17-18 (1959).
114. CONG. GLOBE., 23rd Cong. 1st Sess., 429 (1834).
115. 4 REG. DEB. 508 (1928); see BROWN, supra note 105, at 84.
116. BROWN, supra note 105, at 85.
117. 6 REG. DEB. 302, 340 (1830); 4 REG. DEB. 453-54 (1828); see Hicks, supra note
106, at 229; GATELL, John McKinley, supra note 106, at 772; BROWN, supra note 105, at
85. McKinley insisted he supported the Maysville road under instructions from the Alabama
legislature. Martin, supra note 108, at 17-18, 21.
118. See DONALD B. COLE, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JACKSON 64 (1993)
119. See id. at 66, 108-09.
120. GATELL, John McKinley, supra note 106, at 773.
121. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 84; BROWN, supra note 105, at 106.
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appointment, McKinley successfully campaigned for the Senate
on a platform of constitutional opposition to the national bank,
protective tariffs and internal improvements. 122
John Archibald Campbell. Justice John Campbell was a
public opponent of the national bank, internal improvements and
related exercises of national power, but he may have had some
private Whig sympathies. During the 1830s, Campbell identified
with the Jacksonian coalition in Alabama that supported
Jackson’s veto of the Maysville road and his veto of the bill
rechartering the national bank. 123 Robert Saunders’s recent
biography of Campbell maintains that Campbell early
Democratic allegiance was a facade made necessary by Jackson’s
overwhelming popularity. The future justice during the bank
wars, Saunders insists, secretly maintained an “all-but-Whig
ideology.”124 Campbell’s behavior during the 1836 Alabama
Senate election provides some evidence that his public persona
and private sentiments diverged. While publicly endorsing John
McKinley, the Jacksonian candidate, Campbell informed
intimates that he “infinitely prefer[ed] the alternative,” a
candidate on record as supporting “the constitutionality of tariff
laws, of internal improvements, and [of] the incorporation of a
national bank.”125 Campbell quickly added, however, that his
preferred candidate, Arthur Francis Hopkins, “disclaims all idea
of aiding in any & abhors the policy of each.” 126 Moreover, his
criticisms of John McKinley were personal rather than political.
While Saunders interprets these sentiments as demonstrating that
Campbell thought American System proposals constitutional,127
the better interpretation may be that Campbell was willing to vote
for a candidate who thought American System proposals
impolitic only rather than a candidate he regarded as a
demagogue.
122. See ROBERT SAUNDERS, JR., JOHN ARCHIBALD C AMPBELL: SOUTHERN
MODERATE, 1811-1889, at 31 (1997).
123. See Christine Jordan, The Last of the Jacksonians, in SUPREME COURT
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, YEARBOOK 1980, at 80 (1980); SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 30.
124. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 55-56; see also id. at 39, 69.
125. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 31.
126. Campbell to Henry Goldwaithe, November 29, 1836, Campbell Family Papers,
#135, Fol. 3, Southern Historical Collection, Library of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;
SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 31.
127. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 31.
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Campbell’s beliefs about the political and constitutional
merits of the national bank and related measures are as uncertain
at the time he was appointed to the Supreme Court. Saunders
claims that Campbell by 1850 had “reassessed what he perceived
as the fundamental meaning of the Constitution”128 and had
developed an “increasingly inflexible states’ rights
philosophy.”129 The New York Tribune when Campbell was
nominated declared him “about the ablest man connected with the
ultra State-Rights organization . . . filled with all the dogmas and
mad metaphysics of Mr. Calhoun.”130 Still, Campbell’s precise
opinions on federal power in matter unrelated to slavery cannot
be identified with any degree of certainty at the time he was
nominated to the federal bench. Campbell’s nomination was
strongly supported by state’s rights advocates, but whether that
support transcended slavery issues is unclear. He made few easily
accessible declarations on American system proposals and those
he made are ambiguous. Campbell when opposing secession
pointed out that federal law “has been purged of every law of
which the Southern States [have] complained: the Tariff Act for
protection; the Act for the Bank of the United States . . . .”131 This
passage appears to indicate that Campbell was opposed to federal
power to incorporate a bank and impose protective tariffs, but
Campbell nowhere specifically indicates whether he shared the
southern aversion to these measures.132
Robert Grier. Justice Grier’s opinions on the questions of
national power that arose in Jacksonian America are hard to
discern. Unlike most other Jacksonian jurists, he was not
conspicuously involved in public affairs before joining the bench.
The sparse secondary literature indicates that Grier was a lifelong Democrat who owed his appointments to the state and
federal bench to his partisan affiliation. The Governor of
128. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 83.
129. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 115; see also id. at 68, 87, 93.
130. CHARLES WARREN, 2 T HE S UPREME COURT IN UNITED S TATES H ISTORY 246
(Little, Brown and Company 1926).
131. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 138 (quoting Campbell to Daniel Chandler,
November 12, 1860).
132. Campbell’s postwar statements are as ambiguous on national power. He called
for a strict construction of federal power but did so when objecting to Reconstruction
legislation mandating racial equality rather than federal laws regulating commercial life in
the states. See id. at 226-27.
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Pennsylvania, when recommending Grier to President Polk,
claimed that Grier was “a sincere, and steadfast advocate” of
“[t]he rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the states—the
republican doctrine of state rights—opposition to a national
bank—all the cardinal principles of the democratic party.” 133
Several commentaries on his appointment suggest that Grier’s
views were “orthodox” and that his appointment was favored by
the Calhoun wing of the Democratic party. 134 Unfortunately, no
easily accessible record exists of a speech Grier gave or a letter
he wrote confirming his opposition to the national bank and
commitment to other planks of the Jacksonian constitutional
vision.
Samuel Nelson. Justice Nelson left almost as tiny a paper
trail as Robert Grier. He was deeply involved in both local and
national Democratic politics. Nelson had close affiliations with
the Van Buren wing of the New York Democrats, was their
unsuccessful nominee for the Senate in 1844 and was apparently
given some consideration for the Democratic presidential
nomination.135 Edward Countryman’s biographical essay asserts
that Nelson while on the bench maintained “a deep interest in
public affairs and entertained decided opinions upon all questions
of National policy,” but Countryman does not reveal what those
opinions were.136 Given Nelson’s involvement with the Van
Buren wing of the Democratic party and his nomination for
Senate in 1844, a strong inference can be made that he thought
the national bank and most internal improvements

133. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 232.
134. See Daniel J. Curran, Polk, Politics, and Patronage: The Rejection of George W.
Woodward’s Nomination to the Supreme Court, 121 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 163,
198 n.140 (1997); E UGENE IRVING MCCORMACK, JAMES K. POLK: A POLITICAL
BIOGRAPHY TO THE PRELUDE OF WAR 1795-1845 339 (New York 1965).
135. See Edwin Countryman, Samuel Nelson, 19 THE GREEN BAG 329 (1907);
Richard H. Leach, The Rediscovery of Samuel Nelson, 34 N.Y. HIST. 64, 65 (1953) (“there
is reason to believe he was not without political influence in the Democratic Party as well.”);
FRANK O TTO GATELL, Samuel Nelson, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED S TATES SUPREME
COURT: T HEIR L IVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 825 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds.,
Chelsea House Publishers: New York 1980) (noting that Nelson was “seriously mentioned
as a possible Democratic candidate for President” in 1860).
136. See Countryman, supra note 135, at 333.
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unconstitutional, but that inference is not supported by easily
accessible primary sources.137
Smith Thompson. Justice Thompson’s opinions on the
issues dividing Whigs from Jacksonians are difficult to discern
with complete confidence, but he left more of a paper trail than
either Grier or Nelson. Thompson’s first political associations
were with leading New York anti-Federalists. He formed a
political alliance with Martin Van Buren early in both of their
careers. Thompson was also a protegee of the conservative jurist
James Kent, he strongly identified with the more moderate wing
of New York Republicans during the 1810s, and he supported
John Quincy Adams rather than Jackson during the 1828
presidential election. 138 Thompson when a judge in New York
strongly supported banks incorporated by the states, 139 but the
issue that divided Jacksonians from Whigs concerned the political
and constitutional status of a national bank, not banks per se.
Unfortunately, as Thompson’s biographer acknowledges, on
questions concerning, “Hamiltonian programs,” “Thompson’s
views . . . were not specifically recorded.” 140
Thompson
concurred in a judicial decision condemning state power to
interfere with the national bank his first year on the federal bench,
but he had suggested a narrower conception of federal power
while on the New York bench. He later reaffirmed that narrow
conception of federal power in his dissenting opinion in Brown v.
Maryland.141 John Quincy Adams nevertheless thought that

137. Nelson when on the New York bench supported state charted banks and state
financed internal improvements. See GATELL, Nelson, supra note 135, at 819-22. Such
support was consistent with Jacksonian commitment to state powers.
138. For Thompson’s conflicting and changing political alliances, see ROPER, supra
note 86, at 1, 3, 10-14; GERALD T. DUNNE, Smith Thompson, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED S TATES S UPREME COURT: T HEIR L IVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 475-78, 485 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., Chelsea House Publishers: New York 1980).
139. ROPER, supra note 86, at 13-14.
140. Id. at 35. Roper finds “a similarity in the patterns of Thompson’s and Kent’s
economic thought.” Id. Joseph Story in 1807, before his Whig views became clearly
pronounced, thought Thompson had “the reputation of industry and soundness.” 1 THE L IFE
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH S TORY 145 (William W. Story, ed., Books for Libraries Press:
Freeport, NY, 1971) [hereinafter 1 LIFE AND LETTERS] (quoting Joseph Story to Samuel P.P.
Fay, May 18, 1807).
141. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 449-59 (1827); see also ROPER, supra note 86,
at 142.
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Thompson was a friend of the national bank. 142 Perhaps the best
that can be said of this sparse record is that Thompson probably
would have sustained McCulloch, given his penchant for stare
decisis,143 but might have joined a judicial majority declaring
some internal improvements unconstitutional. Donald Roper
accurately sums up the available evidence when he declares,
“[w]hat Thompson would have done had he been faced with
positive Congressional legislation is so far removed from the
actual facts that it is hardly worth conjecture. For what it is worth,
however, he probably would have upheld such laws.”144
Henry Baldwin. Justice Baldwin in sane moments was
nearly certain to support federal power, though those moments
became rarer during his tenure on the Supreme Court. 145 Baldwin
in Congress was a leading proponents of internal improvements
and protective tariffs. 146 Carl Swisher describes him as “a
fanatical friend of the Bank.” 147 Baldwin publicly opposed
Jackson’s attempt to destroy the national bank, urged Taney to
halt the administration’s attack on that institution, and joined the
Whig opposition once opposition to Jackson organized.148 Story,
a reliable authority on Whig orthodoxy, thought “quite well of the
[Baldwin] appointment.”149 Baldwin’s later years were marked
by mental illness, but when healthy he was a reliable supporter of
national power.
142. See 8 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 304 (Charles Francis Adams ed.,
1876); TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 45.
143. See ROPER, supra note 86, at 54; DUNNE, supra note 138, at 484.
144. ROPER, supra note 86, at 296.
145. Flavia M. Taylor, The Political and Civic Career of Henry Baldwin, 1799-1830,
24 W. PA. HIST. MAG. 45-49 (1941).
146. Id. at 37, 45-49; FRANK OTTO GATELL, Henry Baldwin, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR L IVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 573-75 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., Chelsea House Publishers: New York 1980).
147. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 181, 211, 311.
148. GATELL, Baldwin, supra note 146, at 576-77; ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 7980.
149. 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 22, at 35 (quoting Joseph Story to Sarah Waldo
Story). Daniel Webster was similarly pleased. See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 49.
While on the court, Baldwin penned a monograph sharply criticizing the views Story
advocated in his Commentaries on the Constitution. Baldwin focused, however, on Story’s
discussion of state laws. His text did not discuss the constitutional status of federal power.
See HENRY BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND N ATURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED S TATES (Da Capo Press: New York
1970). No evidence exists that Baldwin while on the Court modified the views he expressed
in Congress on the national bank internal improvements or the tariff.
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Benjamin Curtis.
Justice Curtis identified with
conservative Whigs throughout his political career. 150 He
“always voted . . . for the candidates of the Whig party while that
organization continued to exist.” 151 Specific records of his
attitude toward the national bank do not seem to have survived,152
in part because Curtis came to prominence after the bank wars
had simmered down. Nevertheless, Curtis was a strong supporter
of Daniel Webster, a prominent bank advocate. Curtis praised
Webster for “the just and sound principles which you have always
held and enforced on [the maintenance of a safe currency],”
which is probably a reference to Webster’s support of the national
bank, and for being “a steady and powerful friend” of “the internal
improvements of the whole United States.” 153 Curtis’s analysis
of the territorial clause in his dissenting opinion in Dred Scott
echoed Marshall’s interpretation of the necessary and proper
clause in McCulloch. “Whether a particular rule or regulation be
needful,” the Massachusetts jurist wrote, “must be finally
determined by Congress.”154 Before joining the bench, Curtis
asserted that “[t]he question whether the Constitution of the
United States gives the power to construct roads [] is an open and
difficult one.”155 Nevertheless, nothing in his antebellum record
supports an inference that Curtis would have declared
150. See STUART S TREICHLER, JUSTICE C URTIS IN THE C IVIL W AR ERA: AT THE
CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 9 (2005) (stating that he was “a leading
spokesman for the Whigs of Massachusetts” and “[h]is constitutional thought . . . was rooted
most of all in what might be called the Whig tradition”).
151. CURTIS, 1 CURTIS supra note 97, at 150; see also id. at 114, 134, 180 (noting that
Justice John McLean “would be a good President”).
152. After the Civil War, Curtis gave a speech implying that the national government
had the power to incorporate a bank. GEORGE T ICKNOR CURTIS, 2 MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN
ROBBINS CURTIS, L.L.D. 366 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., Little, Brown, and Company: Boston
1879) [hereinafter C URTIS, 2 CURTIS].
153. CURTIS, 1 CURTIS, supra note 97, at 115; see also id. at 73, 75, 463-66. Webster
returned the favor by promoting Curtis when Whig presidents had the opportunity to appoint
a Supreme Court justice. Id. at 154; see STREICHLER, supra note 150, at 37; ABRAHAM,
supra note 29, at 88-89 (noting Curtis’s sterling Whig credentials).
154. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 614-15 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“the sound construction of the
constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means
by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body
to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people”). See
STREICHLER, supra note 150, at 141 (noting the parallels between the Curtis dissent in Dred
Scott and the Marshall opinion in McCulloch).
155. CURTIS, 2 CURTIS, supra note 152, at 116.
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unconstitutional proposed Whig exercises of national power and
much indicates that he would have sustained such measures.
Curtis’s behavior during the Civil War was consistent with
his conservative Whig ideology, even as he broke with the
Republican Party. Curtis strongly opposed the policies Lincoln
adopted to fight the Civil War, most notably the emancipation
proclamation and the suspension of habeas corpus.156 These were
issues of presidential power.
Conservative Whigs who
championed broad federal power had nevertheless historically
been opposed to unilateral executive power when exercised by
Andrew Jackson and other Jacksonian presidents. 157 Curtis
remained committed to this distinction between broad federal
power and limited executive power during the 1860s. On
questions of national power, or at least national powers granted
by the Constitution of 1789, Curtis remained an orthodox Whig.
He condemned Lincoln for performing solos, but supported the
Legal Tender Acts passed by Congress. Curtis defended
congressional power to declare paper money legal tender before
the Supreme Court, a defense that relied heavily on the principles
underlying McCulloch v. Maryland.158
John McLean.
Justice McLean was a committed
“Madisonian Whig.”159 McLean claimed “he had never voted an
anti-Whig ticket,” and that “[n]o person in the [United States]
desires more ardently than I do, the ascendency of Whig
principles generally.”160 Paul Finkelman notes that McLean “[a]t
various times in his career . . . was considered a National
Republican, a Jacksonian Democrat, an Anti-Mason, a Free
Democrat, a Whig, a Free Soiler, a Know-Nothing, . . . and a
Republican,” but during his time on the Supreme Court he “was

156. Id. at 306-35.
157. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL C ULTURE OF THE AMERICAN
WHIGS 87-92 (1979); HOLT, supra note 4, at 28-30.
158. See STREICHLER, supra note 150, at 294; Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 606
(1869); id. at 629-30 (Miller, J., dissenting).
159. VERITAS, A S KETCH OF THE L IFE OF JOHN MCLEAN OF O HIO 15 (1846); id. at 67, 9.
160. FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN ON THE
UNITED S TATES S UPREME COURT 110 (1937) (quoting John McLean to John Teesdale,
December 17, 1846); BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, LETTERS OF JOHN MCLEAN TO JOHN TEESDALE
720 (William Salter ed., October 1899); see WEISENBURGER, MCLEAN, supra note 162, at
79-80 (noting that by 1832 McLean was an “anti-Jackson man”).
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unalterably hostile to the Democratic Party.”161 McLean proved
a strong supporter of American System proposals. When in
Congress during the 1810s, he was a devotee of internal
improvements and protective tariffs, as well as a thorn in the side
of John Randolph, the leader of the old Republicans in the House
of Representatives. An admiring biography declared that
McLean “has always sustained the great Whig cause and
measures—has supported a Revenue Tariff, shaped for the
protection of Home Industry; a well regulated system of
Currency; and uniformly opposed the Sub-treasury,” the banking
system favored my many Jacksonian Democrats. 162 Finkelman
observes that McLean on the Taney Court “emerged as a
moderate nationalist on commercial issues” who “kept alive the
tradition of Marshall and Story that Congress and the Constitution
were superior to the states.” 163 Story regarded McLean as “a good
and satisfactory appointment,” maintained “an intimate
friendship” with him while they were on the bench, and “was
warmly interested that [McLean] should become a candidate for
the Presidency.”164
McLean might have betrayed Whig commitments in the
right circumstances, but Jacksonians hopes of gaining his vote
diminished each decade McLean sat on the bench. McLean’s
attitude towards the national bank shifted earlier his career with
his partisan allegiances. When a National Republican in 1816
McLean voted against the bank in Congress, but when his Whig
commitments firmed up, McLean made clear he thought the
constitutional issues had been settled by McCulloch. He informed
a correspondent, “[t]he question is undoubtedly settled as fully as
it is possible to settle any question arising on the construction of
the Constitution.”165 Given McLean’s constant hunger for the
presidency, the possibility that he might have cast a vote against
161. Finkelman, supra note 42, at 524, 531.
162. VERITAS, supra note 159, at 15; id. at 7. For specific Whig positions that McLean
endorsed, see WEISENBURGER, supra note 160, at 18, 33, 48-49, 75-76, 85, 108;
BIBLIOTHECA S ACRA, supra note 160, at 722.
163. See Finkleman, supra note 42, at 538.
164. See 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 140, at 564 (quoting Joseph Story to
William Fettyplace, March 1829); See also 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 22, at 35;
ROGER T ANEY, supra note 2, at 431 (quoting Story to McLean, Oct. 9, 1843).
165. BIBLIOTHECA S ACRA, supra note 160, at 722. For McLean’s waffling on the
bank issue, see id. at 721-22; WEISENBURGER, supra note 160, at 17, 93-95.
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some aspect of the American System under the right conditions
cannot be ruled out.166 Still, while McLean’s tendency to trim his
principles means he might have voted to declare unconstitutional
specific details of the American System, little doubt exists that his
vote in most cases would have followed Justice Story.
Joseph Story. Joseph Story was the most certain vote on
the Taney Court for sustaining exercises of national power. Story
was a member of the unanimous Court in McCulloch that declared
constitutional federal power to incorporate a national bank.
While purporting to be above partisan politics, Story admitted to
voting a straight Whig ticket, 167 frequently drafted legislation
asserting national powers for Whigs to introduce in Congress, 168
and regarded the principles underlying McCulloch as of
“fundamental importance to the existence of the government.” 169
He told McLean that “a national bank is indispensable for the true
and permanent interests of the Union.”170 When the War of 1812
ended, Story called on National Republicans to “extend the
national authority over the whole extent of power given by the
Constitution.”171 “Let us,” he declared,
have great military and naval schools; an adequate
regular army; the broad foundations laid of a permanent
navy; a national bank; a national system of bankruptcy;
a great navigation act; a general survey of our ports, and
appointments of port-wardens and pilots; Judicial
Courts which shall embrace the whole constitutional
166. See ROPER, supra note 86, at 104 (noting McLean’s willingness to “trim his
principles” when doing so might advance his political ambitions). For McLean’s presidential
ambitions, see Finkelman, supra note 42, at 519, 520, 525-33; Brickner, supra note 42, at
193, 202-04.
167. For Story’s allegiance to the Whig party, see 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note
22, at 424, 426, 538, 540; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 430 (quoting Story to Henry Clay,
August 3, 1842 (“I am a Whig”)).
168. For Story’s career as a legislative draftsperson on such matters as federal
common law, federal jurisdiction, admiralty and bankruptcy, see 1 L IFE AND LETTERS, supra
note 140, at 234, 246, 315, 437, 439; 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 22, at 268, 271-72,
292-96, 370-73, 402-08; TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 43. Story may have drafted the
rendition procedures that were eventually incorporated into the Fugitive Save Act of 1850.
See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH S TORY: STATESMAN OF THE
OLD REPUBLIC 376-77 (1985).
169. 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 140, at 326 (quoting Joseph Story to Sarah
Wetmore Story, March 17, 1819).
170. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 114-15.
171. 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 140, at 254 (quoting Joseph Story to Nathaniel
Williams, February 22, 1815).
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powers; national notaries; public and national justices
of the peace, for the commercial and national concerns
of the United States.172
Whether Story endorsed New Deal and Great Society
interpretations of McCulloch as sanctioning virtually any exercise
of federal power that did not violate an individual right 173 is
doubtful. Story and other antebellum jurists sympathetic to
American system measures believed that most areas of economic
life were reserved to the states. Nineteenth century Whigs should
not be confused with mid-twentieth century Democrats.174 Still,
on all questions of federal power in which Whigs differed from
Jacksonians, Story could be found firmly on the side of national
power.

172. Id.; see also id. at 270-71, 296, 484-85; 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 22, at
82.
173. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966); United States v. Darby,
311 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941).
174. See generally Howard Gillman, More on the Origins of the Fuller Court’s
Jurisprudence: Reexamining the Scope of Federal Power over Commerce and
Manufacturing in Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Law, 49 POL. RES. Q. 415 (1996);
Howard Gillman, The Struggle over Marshall and the Politics of Constitutional History, 47
POL. RES. Q. 877 (1994).
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III. THE SCORECARD
TABLE ONE:
1836
Taney
replaces
Marshall/
Barbour
replaces
Duvall

1837
New
seats/Catro
n
and
McKinley

1841
Daniel
replaces
Barbour

1845
Nelson
replaces
Thompso
n

1846
Woodbur
y replaces
Story/175
Grier
replaces
Baldwin

Barbour
Taney

Barbour
Taney

Daniel
Taney

Daniel
Taney

Wayne
Thompso
n
Baldwin
McLean

Catron
Wayne

Catron
Wayne

Catron
Wayne

Daniel
Woodbur
y
Taney
Catron

McKinley
Thomson

McKinley
Nelson

Wayne
McKinley

Story

Baldwin
McLean

McKinley
Thompso
n
Baldwin
McLean

Baldwin
McLean

Grier
Nelson

Story

Story

Story

McLean

175. Woodbury was given a recess appointment in 1845. Levi Woodbury,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Levi_Woodbury [https://perma.cc/X658-JTDN] (last
visited February 26, 2019).
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1851
1853
Curtis
replaces Campbell
Woodbury
McKinley
Daniel
Taney
Catron
Wayne
McKinley
Nelson
Grier
Curtis
McLean

Daniel
Taney
Catron
Wayne
Campbell
Nelson
Grier
Curtis
McLean
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1858
replaces Clifford replaces
Curtis
Daniel
Taney
Clifford
Catron
Wayne
Campbell
Nelson
Grier
McLean

Table One lines up the justices in very rough order according
to their political and constitutional opposition to the national bank
and internal improvements for the purpose of determining who
the median justice might have been had the Taney Court voted on
the constitutionality of an American system proposal. Justices
who identified as Jacksonian Democrats are italicized. The
median justice is bolded. The ordering, as noted above, is rough.
The respect placements of Grier and Nelson is random, as are the
respective placements of Catron and Wayne, Barbour and Daniel,
and all the committed Whig justices.
The lineups support Webster’s fear that the Supreme Court
was likely to overrule McCulloch’s holding that Congress had the
power to incorporate a national bank and more general concerns
that the Jacksonians on the bench might move against other
American system proposals. With exception of the period
between 1853 and 1858, from 1837 to 1860 the Taney Court
majority consisted of justices who had previously been Jackson’s
lieutenants in the bank wars. McKinley, who Polk placed on a
House Ways and Means Committee stacked to condemn the Bank
of the United States, is the median justice for most of this time
period. Wayne, who led the fight in Congress against the national
bank, is the other justice who occasionally appears in the coveted
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five slot. As important, given the possibility that some justices,
McKinley and Campbell, in particular, might have been
unreliable, Jacksonians from 1845 until 1860 enjoyed
supermajorities on the Supreme Court. In several years, eight of
the nine justices on the Supreme Court were Jacksonian
appointees whose Jacksonian constitutional commitments were
repeatedly expressed or vouched for by leading politicians. If, for
example, Campbell at some point between 1853 and 1858
revealed his alleged previously private Whig commitments, the
Taney Court still would have held Congress had no power to
incorporate a national bank or fund internal improvements in the
states had either Nelson or Grier, who were considered orthodox
Jacksonians by their contemporaries, remained true to the
Jacksonian commitments that explain their appointments to the
federal bench.
The historical record belies the possibility that the Bank of
the United States or federally funded internal improvements
would have survived a test case because two or three of the
committed Jacksonians on the bench were as committed to
judicial restraint. As noted above, 176 most Jacksonian judicial
appointments championed judicial power before joining the
bench. Six Jacksonians had no difficulty before the Civil War
declaring that Congress had no power to ban slavery in the
territories, a decision that required narrowly interpreting the
constitutional meaning of “necessary.” 177
The surviving
Jacksonians on the Supreme Court had no difficulty imposing
limits on federal economic power after the Civil War. 178 If a
Taney Court majority believed Congress had no power to
incorporate a national bank or fund internal improvements in the
states, this history suggests that in a proper case that majority
would have declared that Congress had no power to incorporate a
national bank or fund internal improvements in the states.

IV. THE REASON WHY
McCulloch survived, or at least was not overruled, in
Jacksonian American because, contrary to Tocqueville’s
176. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part II.
178. See sources cited supra note 173.

2019

OVERRULING MCCULLOCH?

115

aphorism, “scarcely any political question [arose] in the United
States” during the 30 years before the Civil War “that [was] . . .
resolved . . . into a judicial question.”179 Many political questions
during the Taney period were resolved into constitutional
questions. Each element of the American plan, the national bank,
internal improvements, protective tariffs and the distribution of
surplus funds, was discussed in constitutional terms by members
of Congress and presidents. 180
Nevertheless, the
constitutionalization of controversies over the national bank and
American plan did not lead to judicialization. The Supreme Court
as a whole did not speak decisively on the constitutionality of any
American plan measure debated in Congress before Lincoln’s
election. Daniel was the only member of the tribunal who offered
an opinion on internal improvements.181 The other justices
ignored McCulloch, McCulloch’s claims about national powers,
and the implications of McCulloch for other Whig programs.182
The status of slavery in the territories and the means for
recapturing fugitive slaves were the only two political questions
that excited sustained national attention immediately before the
Civil War that were resolved into judicial questions adjudicated
by the Taney Court. The other constitutional issues that the Taney
Court adjudicated, while of importance to the parties and court
watchers, attracted little national political attention. 183
The narrow construction of national power that Jacksonians
in the executive and legislative branches of the national
government championed partly explains why the Jacksonian
majority on the Taney Court did not overrule or significantly
narrow McCulloch. The Supreme Court could revisit the
constitutionality of the national bank or some other controversial
exercise of national power only after the national government
adopted or implemented some core element of the American plan.
179. Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America., I THE AMERICAN H ISTORICAL
REVIEW 245 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945).
180. See Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions:
Tocqueville’s Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 534-35 (2005).
181. See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 151, 180-81 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
182. See DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL
AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCC ULLOCH V. MARYLAND 524 (2019) (forthcoming)
(“By the early 1850s, the Taney Court had ignored McCulloch into oblivion, and reversed
its thrust”).
183. See Graber, supra note 179, at 525-29.
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Whigs and Democrats agreed that the federal government had no
constitutional obligation to incorporate a national bank or finance
certain internal improvements. When the federal government
failed to adopt those or other constitutionally controversial
exercises of national power, the questions of constitutional law
debated in Congress could not be resolved into a lawsuit. A
Supreme Court primed to overrule McCulloch was denied that
opportunity when two national bank bills were vetoed by
Jacksonian presidents, when Jacksonian presidents vetoed other
American System bills, and when Congress rejected proposed
exercises of national power.184
The truncated agenda of the Taney Court also reflects the
lack of support services for litigation in antebellum America.
Many constitutional issues are resolved into judicial issues only
when either government or private organizations provide victims
of claimed constitutional wrongs with expert attorneys and other
services necessary to initiate and maintain litigation. 185 Such
services were rarely available in Jacksonian America. Aggrieved
antebellum Americans did not have access to an American Civil
Liberties Union analogue, that might sponsor litigation aimed at
expanding constitutional rights or a Pacific Legal Foundation
analogue, that might sponsor litigation aimed at curbing federal
powers. This lack of support for constitutional litigation was
184. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
Richardson ed., 1987) (no power to finance
local improvements); id. at 28 (no power to establish a national bank); John Tyler, Veto
Message, in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND P APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 100113 (James D. Richardson ed.,1987) (no power to incorporate a bank); id. at 1021-23 (no
power to improve navigation of rivers); James K. Polk, Veto Message, in 4 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND P APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 769-770 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1987) (no power to construct local improvements); id. at 775-776; Franklin Pierce, Veto
Message, in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND P APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 170-73
(James D. Richardson ed., 1987) (no power to construct hospitals for the insane); id. at 207209 (no power to make local improvements); id. at 199-208 (no power to make internal
improvements); James Buchanan, Veto Message, in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND P APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 355-56 (James D. Richardson ed., 1987) (no power over
education); id. at 545-48 (no power to make local improvements); id. at 569-70 (no power
to give public lands away to settlers). Congress failed to pass constitutionally controversial
exercises of federal power when Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore, two Whigs, were
president.
185. See CHARLES R. EPP, EXTERNAL PRESSURE AND THE S UPREME COURT’S
AGENDA 255, 260-61 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); see generally
SUSAN E. L AWRENCE, T HE P OOR IN COURT: T HE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 11-12 (1990).
AND P APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 197 (James D.
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partly rooted in elite understandings that the point of litigation
was to win. John C. Calhoun and other South Carolinians
preferred nullification to litigation because they believed that the
Marshall Courts would uphold the constitutionality of protective
tariffs.186 Abolitionists were the only political activists in
Jacksonian America who consistently provided support services
for litigation and who were willing to litigate when the chances
of success were limited. Federal courts were able to resolve
constitutional questions about federal power to pass fugitive slave
acts and the status of slavery in the territories because
abolitionists or other persons opposed to slavery represented
persons of color free of charge or for nominal fees. 187
The way the Supreme Court resolved constitutional
questions in slavery cases nevertheless casts doubt on whether
Jacksonian vetoes and the absence of litigation support services
fully explain why the Taney Court in the thirty years before the
Civil War refrained from specifically ruling on federal power to
incorporate a national bank, finance certain internal
improvements, distribute government surpluses to the states or
impose protective tariffs. Taney Court majorities in both Prigg
and Dred Scott engaged in far-ranging discussions that were not
necessary to the result in the case. Justices Story and Chief Justice
Taney in Prigg debated at length whether states were obligated to
help enforce the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 188 even though the
case could have been decided solely by declaring that
slaveholders had a right to recaption independent of the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793 or that Pennsylvania’s liberty laws were
inconsistent with federal law. 189 Dred Scott could have been
resolved as a choice of law case, 190 with no need to consider
either whether free persons of color might be citizens of the
United States or the constitutional status of slavery in the
186. See John C. Calhoun, Exposition Reported by the Special Committee, in THE
PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 447 (Clyde N. Wilson & W. Edwin Hemphill eds., 1977).
187. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT C ASE: ITS S IGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 252 (1978); Richard H. Sewell & Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free
Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War, 57 J. AM.
HIST. 281-84 (1970).
188. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 613-21 (1842); id. at 626-36 (Taney,
C.J., concurring).
189. See Prigg, 41 U.S. 539 at 579, 589; id. at 626-27 (Taney, C.J., concurring).
190. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 457-69 (1856) (Nelson, J., concurring).
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territories, or having decided that free persons of color had no
power to sue in a federal court, Taney could have cut the
discussion of congressional power to ban slavery in the west. 191
Given the Taney Court’s willingness to make “maximalist”
decisions when slavery was on the table, questions remain as to
why the Justices consistently made “minimalist” decisions when
adjudicating cases concerned with other national powers. 192
Jacksonian commitments to partisan supremacy may better
explain judicial silence on McCulloch and the constitutional
status of the national bank during the thirty years before the Civil
War. Partisan supremacists believe constitutional questions are
best settled by dominant political parties.193 Martin Van Buren
articulated the fundamental premise of partisan supremacy when
he claimed, “[i]f different interpretations are put upon the
Constitution by the different departments, the people is the
tribunal to settle the dispute. Each of the departments is the agent
of the people, doing their business according to the powers
conferred; and where there is a disagreement as to the extent of
these powers, the people themselves, through the ballot-boxes,
must settle it.”194 Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln were
dedicated to some version of partisan supremacy. 195 The postCivil Amendments make sense only in light of Republican
commitments to partisan supremacy. 196 The Taney Court’s
willingness to remain on the sidelines during the debates over
American System proposals is another manifestation of
nineteenth century commitments to having dominant political
parties rather than courts per se resolve the most constitutionally
controversial issues of the day.

191. Id. at 427-28.
192. On the difference between “maximalist” and “minimalist” decisions, see
generally C ASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
193. For discussions of partisan supremacy, see MARK A. GRABER, SEPARATION OF
POWERS 224, 235-42 (Karen Orren & John C. Compton eds., 2018) [hereinafter GRABER,
Separation of Powers]; Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and
the Constitution of Memory, 62 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 639, 649-50 (2018) [hereinafter Forgotten
Fourteenth Amendment].
194. MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND COURSE OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN THE UNITED S TATES 330 (1867).
195. See GRABER, Separation of Powers, supra note 192, at 237-39.
196. See Graber, Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 192, at 650.
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Jacksonians from 1828 until 1860 consistently limited the
judicial agenda by making self-conscious decisions not to resolve
constitutional questions into judicial questions. When, as was the
case with internal improvements and Negro Seamen’s Acts,
elected officials made clear that they preferred legislative and
executive solutions to hotly contested constitutional question, the
Supreme Court stayed out of the political fray. 197 Congress
prevented constitutional litigation over trade policy by steadfastly
refusing to describe the duty on any good as a protective tariff. 198
The central legislative debate during the New Mexico/Texas
boundary dispute was whether Congress should draw the
boundary line or authorize a lawsuit that would require the
Supreme Court to draw the boundary line. After much debate, the
legislative option was chosen. No litigation followed even though
the issue was theoretically justiciable. 199
Partisan supremacy differs from both legislative and
executive supremacy. No institution has any inherent right to
settle constitutional issues. Rather, the dominant party designates
the proper forum for resolving particular constitutional
controversies. On matters Jacksonians were united, they
preferred legislative and executive solutions. Jackson maintained
the election of 1832 established executive power to resolve the
constitutional status of the national bank. 200 On matters
Jacksonians were divided, they preferred judicial solutions. Dred
Scott and Prigg were handed down only after the legislature
whose laws were under constitutional attack initiated judicial
policymaking.201 Legislative supremacy on American plan
measures and judicial supremacy on slavery measures were
derived from the more fundamental commitments to partisan
supremacy.
Jacksonians had no need for a judicial decision overruling
McCulloch while they controlled the Senate, House or
Presidency.
Jacksonian majorities could determine the
197. See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 151, 158 (1845) (argument of Nelson, A.G.);
TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 393-94.
198. See Calhoun, supra note 185, at 447.
199. See ELBERT B. SMITH, T HE PRESIDENCIES OF ZACHARY T AYLOR & MILLARD
FILLMORE 103, 173-74 (1988).
200. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 186, at 206.
201. See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 538; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 186, at
206.

120

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:1

constitutional meaning of such phrases as “necessary and proper”
and restrict the scope of implied powers by rejecting any measure
Democrats thought inconsistent with a strict construction of the
Constitution. No need existed for the Supreme Court to limit
government power that was already being limited by Congress or
the White House. No need existed for a Supreme Court decision
resolving interparty squabbles over what internal improvements
were and were not constitutionally permitted that Jacksonians
were resolving in the elected branches of the national
government. Judicial dicta declaring that the federal government
had no power to incorporate a national bank or sponsor internal
improvements might have been inconvenient while Jacksonians
reigned. Jacksonians objected to the latitude of McCulloch, but
not the concept of implied powers per se. 202 They supported some
exercises of national powers. Many Jacksonians favored some
internal improvements under certain conditions, with prominent
Westerners being particularly enthusiastic. 203 A Supreme Court
decision made without the consent of Jacksonians from all
regions of the United States might have embarrassed some
proposed Jacksonian exercises of national power and truncated
intraparty debates over the constitutionality of other exercises of
national powers.
Jacksonians were commitment to partisan supremacy only
when Jacksonians had sufficient control of the elected branches
of national government to prevent American system measures
from becoming law. Once Jacksonians lost control of the elected
branches of government, the Jacksonian justices on the bench
became raging judicial supremacists. 204 Every former Democrat
on the bench voted in 1869 and 1870 to declare that the federal
government had no power to make paper money legal tender, 205
even though the general principles underlying McCulloch
provided strong, probably convincing support for the Legal
202. See David S. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 150-51, 158.
203. See Eric Foner, The Wilmot Proviso Revisited, 56 J. AM. HIST. 262 (1969).
204. See Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of the Chase Court Activism, 25 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 17 (2000).
205. Salmon Chase, Stephen Field, Nelson, Clifford, and Grier were in the majority
in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1969). Chase, Nelson, Clifford, and Field dissented
in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870). Chase and Field, while appointed by
Republican presidents, were Democrats before joining the bench. See Graber, The
Jacksonian Origins, supra note 203, at 18.
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Tender Acts.206 If the surviving Jacksonians were willing to
exercise judicial power to strike down aggressive exercises of
national power by a Republican controlled government, little
reason exists for thinking those justices would have been more
restrained when adjudicating aggressive exercises of national
power by a Whig controlled government. Had William Henry
Harrison lived and fulfilled his inaugural promise from refraining
from using the presidential veto except in exceptionally rare
circumstances, 207 McCulloch, at least the McCulloch that
authorized the national government to incorporate a national
bank, would most likely not have survived the 1840s.

V. TEACHING MCCULLOCH IN 1858 AND 2019
The high probability that McCulloch’s holding on
congressional power to incorporate a national bank would have
been overruled had the Supreme Court been given the opportunity
in a proper case raises questions about how to teach constitutional
law in periods of regime change. Constitutional pedagogy is
simple when regime change takes the form of constitutional
amendments or decisions that overrule decisions stating central
commitments of the previous regime. The post-Civil War
amendments relegated Dred Scott and Prigg to classes on
constitutional history or constitutional theory, the small portion
of a constitutional law class dedicated to constitutional history or
constitutional theory or perhaps to a constitutional law class
devoted to the use of anti-canonical cases in constitutional
argument.208 The New Deal Constitutional Revolution had the
same impact on such judicially overruled cases as Carter v.
Carter Coal Company209 and Hammer v. Dagenhart.210 Had the
Supreme Court in 1845 declared the federal government had no
206. Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 629-31 (Miller, J., dissenting); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S.
at 537-39.
207. William Henry Harrison, Inaugural Address, in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND P APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 1, 10-11 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897).
208. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
209. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
210. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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power to incorporate a national bank, no constitutional law class
in 1858 would have taught McCulloch as good law and no
hypothetical bar examination in 1858 would have marked as a
correct assertions that a Third Bank of the United States was a
constitutionally appropriate exercise of federal power.
Constitutional pedagogy is more complicated when regime
change takes the form of constitutional practices that ignore
decisions stating the central commitments of the past regime. In
such instances, the legal status of those past regime commitments
is ambiguous. They remain technically good law. Nevertheless,
the decisions stating those commitments have no impact on actual
constitutional practice. While stating the holding of McCulloch
might have been the right answer to an 1858 bar examination
question on federal power to incorporate the national bank, that
citation had no persuasive force in constitutional controversies
adjudicated by the Taney Court or by Jacksonian presidents.
Constitutional law professors in these circumstances must decide
whether to teach the landmark decisions of a previous regime
until they are overruled or teach the precedents, principles and
processes that actually guide constitutional decision making in
their present.
Teach McCulloch until overruled. Chief Justice Salmon
Chase in Hepburn v. Griswold provided the foundations for
teaching McCulloch in 1858 when he declared that McCulloch
after 1819 was “accepted as a correct exposition of the
Constitution.”211 Jacksonians did not “accept” McCulloch in the
sense that the decision was a precedent that guided constitutional
decision making. The Taney Court never cited McCulloch as a
precedent for implied federal powers or as a precedent for federal
power to incorporate a national bank. McCulloch was “accepted”
in Jacksonian American only in the sense that the decision had
not been formally overruled by constitutional amendment or
judicial decree. Presenting McCulloch as good law in 1858 taught
future practitioners that the case remained a living precedent that
could be revived without further ceremony. Decisions that are
explicitly reversed by constitutional amendment or judicial
decision can be revived only by a contrary constitutional
amendment or another judicial decision overruling the initial
211. 75 U.S. 603, 614 (1869).
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overruling. Neither was necessary to reinvigorate McCulloch’s
understanding of implied powers or any other case that has merely
been ignored by constitutional decision makers for long periods
of time.212 All that was necessary for the federal government to
incorporate a national bank in 1858 was more persuasive
arguments or more persuadable judges.
Teach McCulloch and the Cases Narrowing McCulloch.
David Schwartz in his wonderful forthcoming book provides the
foundations for teaching McCulloch and the Taney Court cases
discussing implied powers. 213 Schwartz points out that the
Supreme Court from 1837 until 1860 never repudiated
McCulloch’s holding that the federal government had the power
to incorporate a national bank or the general principles underlying
the implied powers of the federal government. Instead, in a series
of opinions that never mentioned McCulloch, the justices adopted
narrower understandings of implied federal power and broader
understandings of reserved state powers. Students training to be
practicing attorneys in 1858 should have known McCulloch
because attorneys may cite as good law any case that has not been
explicitly overruled. They should have known such Taney Court
cases as United States v. Marigold 214 and United States v.
Coombs215 because those were the precedents that federal courts
would likely rely on when determining the scope of federal
powers.
Teach McCulloch and the Bank Veto. What Schwartz
describes as the “revisionist” account of Jackson’s bank veto 216
provides the foundation for teaching both McCulloch and the
Bank Veto. On this account, Jackson was not challenging the
judicial decision to sustain a federal law incorporating a national
bank, but merely determining whether to exercise powers the
Supreme Court had acknowledged were vested in election
officials.217 Practicing attorneys in 1858 needed to know
212. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (reviving McPherson v. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1 (1892) after 108 years).
213. The first three sentences of this paragraph summarize SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 181.
214. 50 U.S. 560 (1850).
215. 37 U.S. 72 (1837).
216. Schwartz, Defying McCulloch, supra note 14, at 131.
217. See G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89
VA. L. REV. 1463, 1496-97 (2001).
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McCulloch’s analysis of implied powers because Marshall’s
opinion remained the official law of the land in Jacksonian
America with respect to the judiciary’s exposition of
constitutional law. They needed to know Jackson’s veto of the
bank bill because that was the constitutional precedent that guided
the elected branches of the national government. Professors by
juxtaposing McCulloch and the bank veto could teach students
preparing to become practicing attorneys three important features
of Jacksonian and American constitutionalism.
First, in
Jacksonian America, presidents exercised independent
constitutional authority and did not defer to Supreme Court
decisions broadly interpreting federal power and narrowly
interpreting the reserved rights of the states. Second, elected
officials in the United States at all times have the power to refrain
from exercising what the Supreme Court has ruled to be their
constitutional powers and elected officials may refrain because
they believe the Supreme Court has too broadly interpreted their
constitutional powers. Third, when Jacksonian presidents are
exercising independent constitutional authority or when any
government official is claiming constitutional grounds for
refraining from exercising what judicial precedent regards as
constitutional powers, the constitution in and outside of the courts
diverges. Students preparing to be practicing attorneys in 1858
should know that while McCulloch governed what federal powers
federal courts would sustain, the Bank Veto governed federal
power the elected branches of government would exercise.
Do Not Teach McCulloch. Abraham Lincoln provided
foundations for not teaching McCulloch at all in 1858 when in his
sixth debate with Stephen Douglas he declared, “[d]id not he and
his political friends find a way to reverse the decision of that
[Supreme] Court in favor of the constitutionality of the National
Bank?”218 Teaching McCulloch’s discussion of implied powers
as good constitutional law in 1858, from this perspective, made
no more pedagogical sense than presently teaching as good
constitutional law Dred Scott, the judicial decision in Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.219 declaring the income tax

218. Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy, Illinois, in
3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM L INCOLN 1, 278 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
219. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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unconstitutional or Plessy v. Ferguson.220 Constitutional lawyers
concerned only with persuading Supreme Court justices and other
constitutional decision makers had no need to be taught
McCulloch in 1858 because that decision was unlikely to be cited
by any court or constitutional decision maker for any
constitutional proposition, was explicitly repudiated by the party
presently controlling the exercise of federal powers and was
likely to be overruled should the occasion arise. McCulloch was
relevant to the practice ready lawyer in the years immediately
before the Civil War only to the extent such an attorney could use
some knowledge of constitutional history and theory, or as an
example of how lawyers sometimes manipulate anti-canonical
cases to persuade judicial tribunals. 221
Future Teaching. The United States appears to be
experiencing a regime change at least as significant as the regime
change that took place at the onset of the Jacksonian Era, 222 but
the nature and direction of that regime change is yet to be fully
determined. On one possible future, the Trump/McConnell
regime will consolidate, regain control of the House of
Representatives and implement a very conservative constitutional
vision. On another possible future, the 2018 national election will
be the dawn of a new progressive era in which liberal Democrats
gain control of all the branches of the national government and
implement their constitutional vision. Constitutional decision
makers in these new regimes may mark the new political order
with constitutional amendments and constitutional decisions
explicitly overruling those decisions embodying the central
constitutional commitments of the rival regime. They might also
follow the Jacksonian model and simply narrow or ignore
particular constitutional landmarks of the past.
Jacksonian paths are open to political activists on the left and
right. Americans in the near future might experience a
conservative regime in which Roe v. Wade223 is never overruled,
but judicial decisions permit states to regulate abortion in ways

220. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
221. See Greene, supra note 207, at 391.
222. See SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION
(University of Chicago Press 2019) (forthcoming); Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco:
Why the American Political System is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159 (2014).
223. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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that make terminating a pregnancy as difficult as was the case
before 1973. In this regime, commerce clause precedents from
the New Deal remain good law in theory, but few if any federal
statutes remain on the books that regulate transactions that take
place entirely within a single state. Presidents routinely veto for
constitutional reasons legislation attempting such exercises of
federal power on the ground that the commerce clause does not
permit the federal government to regulate transactions that take
place within a single state or because the impact on interstate
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant federal
regulation. Alternatively, Americans in the near future might
experience a progressive regime in which District of Columbia v.
Heller 224 is never overruled, but courts routinely sustain all gun
control regulations. In this regime, precedents declaring
constitutional the imposition of capital punishment remain good
law in theory, but no murderer is ever executed. The president
and state governors in the few jurisdictions whose law permits
executions routinely commute all death sentences on the ground
that they believe capital punishment violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments or because the crime in question is not
sufficient heinous to merit the ultimate sanction.
Constitutional law professors in these regimes will have to
ponder pedagogical issues analogous to those they might have
considered had they been teaching in 1858. They might teach Roe,
Wickard v. Filburn,225 Heller, and Gregg v. Georgia226 as good
constitutional law until those cases are explicitly reversed by
judicial decision or constitutional amendment. They might offer
their students a more refined view of constitutional law by
combining Roe or Heller with the most recent judicial decision
sustaining remarkably burdensome abortion or gun control
regulations. They might emphasize the difference between the
constitution in and outside of courts by combining Wickard or
Gregg with a presidential veto on constitutional grounds of a bill
regulating intrastate commerce or a gubernatorial commutation
on constitutional grounds of a death sentence.
Finally,
constitutional law professors might communicate that a practice
ready attorney in these regimes need not know Roe, Wickard,
224. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
225. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
226. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

2019

OVERRULING MCCULLOCH?

127

Heller, and Gregg by ignoring those cases, confining them to
history or theory courses or confining them to the history and
theory section of their constitutional law course.

